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Abstract
On June 2, 2009, NYSE LIFFE Amsterdam reduced the tick size for options
trading at prices below AC0.20 from AC0.05 to AC0.01 and on April 1, 2010,
the exchange increased the price threshold to AC0.50. We study the effect
of that tick size reduction on the liquidity of individual equity options. In
this respect, this study is uniquely positioned in the options context where
moneyness is a clear additional factor in the implementation of the tick size
changes. We show that, in general, quoted and traded option liquidity in-
creased but at a rate decreasing with option moneyness. Real costs fell more
for the lower priced contracts. Importantly, we show that the ability of the
market to absorb larger trades has potentially diminished after the change
in the tick size. We document a substantial increase in quote revisions which
implies an increase in price competition and, as a result, an improvement
in market quality. Finally, the decrease in the tick size led to an increase in
hedging activity using deep-out-of-the-money puts.
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1 Introduction
“The Participants are filing the proposed Plan in order to implement
a pilot program for a one-year Pilot Period that, among other things,
would widen the quoting and trading increments for certain small cap-
italization stocks (Tick Size Pilot Program).” (SEC, 2014-176)
“People are finally recognizing that the one-size-fits-all stocks is a dis-
aster” (D. Weild, former VC of NASDAQ, in Massoudi and Mackenzie,
2013)
Since decimalization at US exchanges in 2001, regulators have engaged in a bat-
tle with the exchanges and market makers over whether small tick sizes enhance
market quality. The debate surrounds the trade-off between reducing transac-
tion costs for investors and incentivising market makers to support illiquid stocks.
This paper contributes new evidence to this debate from a “natural experiment”
for option contracts trading at NYSE LIFFE.
On June 2, 2009, NYSE LIFFE introduced the Premium Based Tick Size rule
(henceforth PBTS) on all single stock options trading at NYSE LIFFE Amsterdam.
According to the new rule, equity options trading at a premium of AC0.20 or lower
could be quoted at a tick size of AC0.01, whereas options trading at prices higher
than the threshold continued to be quoted at a minimum tick of AC0.05. On April
1, 2010, NYSE LIFFE increased the price threshold from AC0.20 to AC0.50. This
paper presents evidence on the effect of the implementation of the PBTS on the
quote and trade liquidity of individual equity options. Our study is uniquely
positioned in the options context where moneyness is a clear additional factor in
the implementation of the tick size changes.
Theoretically, Harris (1994) suggests that a decrease in tick size is expected to
lead to a narrowing of bid-ask spreads if the current tick size is greater than the
size that would be quoted if no minimum tick was enforced. Most importantly,
spreads are expected to narrow more for the lower priced assets for which the
minimum tick size is a more binding constraint. Also, to the extent that there
is a negative association between trading volume and spreads, the reduction in
tick size would increase trading volume. Meanwhile, market depth is expected to
decrease, because traders desiring to trade large sizes may be deterred since the
small tick size increases the probability that other smaller traders may step ahead
of them in the order book. On this latter point, Portniaguina et al. (2006) show
that in hybrid markets like the NYSE, a reduction in tick size reduces the value
of a limit order. This may lead to the order book becoming very thin and quoted
spreads becoming very wide. The authors show that a decrease in the minimum
tick size increases the cost of submitting large orders and subsequently leads to
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order splitting (stealth trading). However, the effect of this change on specialist
participation rates is not expected to be uniform. For stocks with a smaller initial
average trade size, order splitting should not be as prevalent as for firms with large
initial trade sizes. Portniaguina et al. (2006) show that market maker profits will
be positive for the former stocks and less positive, or possibly negative, for the
latter.
Empirically, in equity and futures markets, several studies have shown that
a reduction in tick size delivers two main outcomes. Firstly, spreads generally
narrow (see Harris, 1991, 1994; Seppi, 1997; Bollen and Whaley, 1998; Goldstein
and Kavajecz, 2000; Jones and Lipson, 2001; Bessembinder, 2003; Smith et al.,
2006). Secondly, market depth deteriorates as a smaller tick size makes front
running more profitable for smaller investors and increases order transparency for
large traders (see Harris, 1996; Angel, 1997; Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000; Jones
and Lipson, 2001). The latter implies an overall increase in liquidity for small
trades and an overall decrease for institutional trades. Also, Bourghellea and
Declerck (2004) show that a tick size change is not necessarily associated with a
change in liquidity supply but primarily affects order submission strategies. This
is due to the fact that a decrease in the tick size fails to attract liquidity providers
on the limit order book and, if the spread remains unaffected, depth generally still
reduces.
The debate is far from having been resolved in favour of smaller tick sizes.
In 2001, NASDAQ and NYSE replaced the fractional price system with decimal
prices, cutting the tick size to one cent for both markets. However, in June 2013,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was reported to have drafted a pilot
program that would increase the tick size for 100 of the smaller or less liquid US
stocks (see Mamudi and Michaels, 2013). On August 26, 2014, the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission filed a plan to implement the 12-month pilot program
whose outcomes “could have meaningful implications for market quality” (SEC,
2014-176). This was in response to criticism from the financial industry that
“decimalization - a euphemism for the collapse in trading spreads, tick sizes and
commissions - decimated the U.S. IPO market” (Weild et al., 2012, p. 2). In
their view, it is crucial to provide economic incentives to market makers in order
that they continue supporting small stocks and provide analyst coverage. In this
respect, our study is extremely timely. Also, for NYSE LIFFE, market makers are
an integral part of the trading process as, under their contractual obligations with
the exchange, they are obliged to offer competitive two-way quotes across the whole
spectrum of contracts that are trading at the exchange. Thus, the implementation
of the PBTS may lead to lower profits for market makers which may serve as a
disincentive to offer competitive quotes. On the other hand, Harris (1994) suggests
that since market maker profits are a function of volume and spreads, their profits
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would increase overall if volume increases by more than the decrease in spreads.
However, Al-Yahyaee (2013) shows that a decrease in tick size does not always
lead to increases in trading volume.
Our findings suggest that while spread liquidity generally increased more for
deep-out-of-the-money (DOTM) options, depth liquidity deteriorated more for
contracts that are further in-the-money (ITM). This implies that, following the
tick size changes, quoted liquidity generally increased for the DOTM and the out-
of-the-money (OTM) contracts, but at a decreasing rate for greater moneyness.
Similarly, effective spreads decreased more than quoted spreads for contracts with
low moneyness but the significance disappears as moneyness increases. For calls
priced under AC0.20, this drop in effective spreads is due to an overall decrease in
real costs net of the price impact of trades. For contracts priced between AC0.20
and AC0.50, the decrease in spreads is due to a decrease in price impact rather than
a decrease in real costs.
Importantly, we show that the ability of the market to absorb larger trades has
diminished after the tick size change. However, as 60% of trades are retail (Noiville
and Seblain, 2011), we expect that this decrease in liquidity has no effect for the
majority of traders. Consistent with previous findings, trading activity generally
increased after the tick size changes. We document an increase in the volatility
for DOTM puts that potentially reflects a greater appetite for the crash insurance
characteristics of DOTM puts. Finally, we document a substantial increase in
quote revisions. This finding shows strong support for the hypothesis that the
decrease in tick size has resulted in improved price competition for the average
investor.
Our findings have important implications for optimal contract design in equity
options markets. The goal of attracting liquidity has been achieved with two
immediate implications: economic rents have been transferred from market makers
to individual investors and the increase in liquidity has been realized at the expense
of a thinner market for larger investors. The price/time priority rule may not
operate effectively in circumstances when a large trade enters the market and, at
such times, market makers should be allowed to increase their economic rents for
facilitating abnormal trade sizes in ways similar to an upstairs market. A second
possible scenario would be for the exchange to introduce a pro-rata algorithm that
would circumvent the problem with the price priority rule when the tick size is too
small.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the market
structure. Section 3 discusses the positioning of the paper and outlines the testable
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and research design issues, Section 5
presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
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2 NYSE LIFFE Amsterdam Market Structure
NYSE LIFFE is the derivatives branch of NYSE for the European derivatives
market, overseeing a total of five European markets (Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon,
London and Paris). Liquidity is supported by the “Euronext Liquidity Provider
System” (ELPS), where market makers are acting as liquidity providers with the
obligation to submit continuous asks and bids in near-the-money contracts and
receive trading rebates as a return.1
NYSE LIFFE implemented the new tick size for all options trading below
AC0.20, effective from June 2, 2009. The exchange stated that the “PBTS is de-
signed to have the tick size match the level of the premium: a small tick size for
lower prices and a large tick size for higher prices”. Further, the exchange added
that since the introduction of the new tick size, spreads have almost halved for the
affected contracts (see PBTS, 2013).
The implementation of the PBTS rule on NYSE LIFFE Amsterdam is unique
from several perspectives. First, trading at NYSE LIFFE is facilitated by ELPS.
For Amsterdam, the exchange recognizes three types of liquidity providers, the
Primary Market Makers (PMMs), the Competitive Market Makers (CMMs) and
the Extra Competitive Market Makers (CMXs). Market makers’ spread and size
obligations are a function of the price and volatility of the underlying asset (up-
dated semi-annually) and refer to maximum spread and minimum size. Spread
and size obligations are therefore not uniform across all assets. All market makers
are required to trade a minimum number of contracts of high liquidity assets.2
Trading fee reductions are not uniform and are based on a monthly evaluation
of the market maker’s performance. Second, an important feature of the ELPS
in Amsterdam is that PMMs are obliged to offer two-way competitive quotes for
the entire series of contracts for which they are contractually obligated to offer
liquidity. PMMs are obliged to offer continuous quotes for at least 85% of the
relevant number of series and during at least 85% of the specific time period.
However, CMMs and CMXs are obliged to offer liquidity for the near-the-money
contracts only. The above points imply that the implementation of the PBTS
affects PMMs’ quote obligations more than those of CMMs or CMXs, because
the PBTS is more relevant for OTM options that are priced at lower levels than
other contracts. Third, NYSE LIFFE Amsterdam is heavily populated by retail
investors (see Noiville and Seblain, 2011) and concerns have been raised regarding
the potential impact of PBTS on boosting the trading activity for OTM options,
arguing that trading OTM contracts will remain too costly as brokerage retail fees
are high, taking away any savings from trading at a smaller fee (Fooling retail
1“How the Euronext.liffe markets work”. Available on the NYSE LIFFE website.
2Asset liquidity and hence the number of market makers for each asset is assessed and defined
by the exchange.
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investors with new tick size, 2009).
3 Hypotheses
The implementation of the PBTS is expected to have an effect on three features of
trading in equity options: liquidity, trading activity and volatility. In this section,
we develop appropriate hypotheses with respect to these anticipated effects.
While the empirical evidence on the effect of tick size reductions on asset liquid-
ity is overwhelmingly positive for the spread aspect of liquidity, deteriorations in
depth may lead to an overall increase in transaction costs for larger trades. Many
studies report narrower spreads following a tick size reduction (see Harris, 1991
and 1994; Seppi, 1997; Bollen and Whaley, 1998; Bessembinder, 2003; Smith et
al., 2006). However, Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) and Jones and Lipson (2001)
also report a decrease in depth for NYSE stocks after decimalisation. Moreover,
for the UK Long Gilt futures market, ap Gwilym et al. (2005) show that, while
depth decreased following a move to decimal pricing, the spread, measured in
ticks, increased but its monetary value decreased. Regarding a hybrid measure
of liquidity, Bessembinder (2003) reports that effective spreads generally declined
for NYSE and NASDAQ stocks after decimalisation and that small capitalisation
stocks benefited most from the reduction in tick size. None of the previous tick
size studies has employed the quote slope as a hybrid measure of quote liquidity.
We anticipate a reduction in quote slope if overall liquidity has increased. From
the above points, we define the following hypotheses:
Contracts that trade under a smaller tick size will:
Hypothesis 1: Exhibit a decrease in quoted bid-ask spreads.
Hypothesis 2: Exhibit a decrease in depth.
Hypothesis 3: Exhibit an increase in trade and quote liquidity if the benefit from
a reduction in the cost side of liquidity is greater than the cost of a decrease in
liquidity supply.
Effective spreads can be further decomposed to two components: the price
impact, which measures the losses of investors to informed traders, and the re-
alized spread which measures the post-trade price reversal or equally the cost of
providing liquidity net of losses to informed traders (see Bessembinder and Kauf-
man, 1997). If the smaller tick reduces spreads, both the price impact and the
realized spread measures will fall as a consequence. In practice, this implies that
there should be smaller price jumps in either direction with the smaller tick size.
Most important, however, is the relative change of realized spreads to price im-
pact. Realized spreads measure market making profits, hence a greater reduction
in realized spreads as compared to price impact would imply that the hypothesized
decrease in traded liquidity is more a function of a drop in real costs. We derive
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the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Price impact and realized spreads will be smaller for contracts that
trade under the new tick size.
Harris (1994) shows that trading volume will increase following a decrease in
tick size. Also, transaction frequency may increase because it is cheaper to trade
smaller sizes and reduce the cost of being a counterparty to informed traders.
Bacidore (1997) reports that trading volume did not significantly increase at the
Toronto Stock Exchange following a reduction of tick size, and the same finding
is reported for AMEX by Ahn et al. (1996). On the other hand, following an
increase of the tick size for the S&P500 futures contract trading at CME, Bollen
et al. (2003) show an overall widening in spreads and a significant reduction in
trading volume. Chakravarty et al. (2003) show that while trading volume and
the number of trades increased for small NYSE stocks following decimalisation,
there was a significant decrease in trading activity for large size trades. Harris
(1994) also predicts that a reduction in tick size will have more visible effects on
the trade liquidity of the more heavily traded stocks, because it is more likely
that the previous larger tick size acted as a binding constraint for a narrowing of
spreads on these stocks. We subsequently derive the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5: Contracts that trade under a smaller tick size will exhibit an
overall increase in trading activity.
Hypothesis 6: Trade liquidity will increase more for assets that are more heavily
traded.
An important aspect of the implementation of the PBTS is the expectation
of an asymmetric effect on option contracts based on moneyness. In particular,
PBTS is aligned to the option price and as a result the effect should be stronger for
the OTM options, since these are the lowest priced options. PBTS is also expected
to have a stronger positive effect for OTM contracts that are more likely to expire
in-the-money. The probability of exercise is negatively related to moneyness, with
deeper OTM options being less likely to be exercised at maturity, i.e. to expire
ITM, ceteris paribus. In addition, the probability of exercise at maturity for OTM
options with the same moneyness is positively related to the underlying asset’s
volatility. For instance, the price of a more volatile underlying asset is more likely
to exceed at maturity the high strike price of a currently OTM call. A similar
argument applies in the case of OTM puts, where the prices of more volatile
underlying assets are more likely at maturity to fall below the low strike prices of
currently OTM puts.
Overall, we hypothesize that as OTM options written on more volatile un-
derlying assets have a higher probability of being ITM at expiration, the impact
of tick size changes will be greater. A large tick size would constitute a greater
constraint on trading these contracts with higher underlying volatility, and we an-
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ticipate a greater impact on their liquidity following a reduction of the tick size. In
relation to the above, previous research suggests that if decreases in tick size are
associated with lower liquidity then volatility should also increase (Harris, 1994;
Bessembinder, 2003).
Hypothesis 7: Liquidity will increase by less as moneyness increases.
Hypothesis 8: The reduction in spreads for OTM options written on more volatile
underlying assets after the implementation of the PBTS will be greater compared
to that for equally OTM contracts written on less volatile assets.
Hypothesis 9: Option spreads that are affected by the PBTS will exhibit lower
volatility reflecting an overall increase in liquidity.
Finally, while it is not possible to measure execution speed directly, we assume
that the latter is related to the percentage of quote revisions per time interval.
Specifically, a smaller tick size reduces the cost of stepping ahead of other traders in
the order book, and we hypothesize that quote revisions may significantly increase
for those contracts affected by the implementation of the PBTS. Furthermore,
an increase in quote revisions implies more aggressive price competition among
market participants, who update their quotes more often, to the benefit of market
quality. Overall, we argue that an increase in quote revisions after the rules change
will be beneficial to the average investor due to a higher probability of improving
on quoted prices.
Hypothesis 10: The number of quote revisions will increase for the contracts
that are affected by the PBTS.
4 Research Design
The intraday dataset contains information on maturity date, strike price, volume
and price for all individual equity options (henceforth tickers), time-stamped to the
nearest second, separately for asks, bids and trades.3 Each ticker is trading under
different contracts, which vary by the strike price, maturity date and contract
type, i.e. call or put (henceforth sub-tickers). We select options that expire within
a maximum of 365 days, but not within seven days, in order to avoid any very
short term expiration effects. Moneyness is defined as S/K, where K refers to
the option strike price and S to the underlying unadjusted opening price.4 We
categorize sub-tickers according to their moneyness and maturity. For calls, we
3The number of tickers reflects the total number of firm-options trading and it includes delisted
options.
4End-of-day prices for the underlying stocks are obtained from DataStream. All options in
the sample are American style. We drop options with weekly and daily expiry cycles. In total,
90 percent of contracts are maintained in the final sample.
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define DOTM contracts as those with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts
as those with moneyness between 0.9 and 1, and in-the-money (ITM) contracts as
those with moneyness between 1 and 1.1. We drop deep-in-the-money contracts
(calls with moneyness > 1.1), as very few observations fall in this category. The
opposite classification is used for puts.
We delete outliers based on the following criteria. All zero price and out-of-
hours observations are deleted, as are quotes with negative or zero bid-ask spreads.5
Also, as in Wei and Zheng (2010), we control for outliers by dropping quotes with
extreme bid-ask spreads (exceeding 150% and 200% for ITM and OTM options,
respectively).
We focus on a 300-day window around the two stages of the PBTS. The sample
is split into four sub-periods. Sub-periods 1 and 2 refer to the days before (January
3, 2009 to June 1, 2009) and after (June 2, 2009 to October 30, 2009) the initial
implementation of the PBTS at a threshold price of AC0.20 (henceforth Stage 1).
Sub-periods 3 and 4 refer to the days before (November 2, 2009 to March 31, 2010)
and after (April 1, 2010 to August 29, 2010) the increase of the price threshold to
AC0.50 (henceforth Stage 2).
Quoted spreads, depths and option returns are estimated using 5-minute sub-
ticker mid-quotes. On each trading day, we retain bid and ask quotes at 5-minute
intervals. We control for stale pricing by dropping bids and asks that are recorded
more than two minutes prior to each 5-minute interval. We drop the opening and
closing intervals, leaving us with n = 101 intervals in total.
The most commonly used spread measure is the quoted bid-ask spread, defined
as the difference between the most recent ask and bid prices (e.g. Petrella, 2006;
Wei and Zheng, 2010). We control for price level differences by calculating the
percentage bid-ask spread (PBAS), defined as the ratio of quoted spread over the
quote midpoint:
PBASi = 100 × Aski −Bidi
Mi
(1)
where Aski and Bidi are the ask and bid prices sampled at the 5-minute interval
i, respectively, and Mi is the corresponding midquote. Quoted depth represents
a reciprocal measure of liquidity (see Harris, 1990). We measure quoted depth
(Depth) in number of contracts as
Depthi =
V olumeask,i + V olumebid,i
2
(2)
5The exchange is open between 08:00 and 16:30 (GMT). We delete half-days. There are no
zero-volume trades in the raw dataset, which is an important distinction from datasets where
market orders may contain zero volume (pre-reporting).
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where V olumeask,i and V olumebid,i refer to the number of contracts quoted at the
ask and bid prices, respectively, during the 5-minute interval i. The Log Quote
Slope combines the price information from spreads and the quantity information
from depths, and is defined as
LogQuoteSlopei =
log(Aski/Bidi)
log(V olumeask,i) + log(V olumebid,i)
(3)
The Log Quote Slope measures the slope of a line connecting the bid and ask
price/quantity pairs (Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001). Hence, liquidity will improve
if depth increases or if spread narrows. The Effective Half Spread is used as a
second measure of hybrid liquidity because, even though it does not contain a
direct measure of quoted depth, it provides an ex-post estimate of the effect of a
large trade on the best bid and ask. If, for example, a large trade has consumed
more than one level of the limit order book, the effective spread will be wider than
the quoted spread. The realized spread is a measure of transaction costs net of
price impact. The latter is a measure of adverse selection costs.6
We calculate effective spreads as follows (see Venkataraman, 2001):
EffSpreadi = 200 ×D × Pricei −Midquotei
Midquotei
(4)
where D is a trade indicator dummy that takes the value of -1 if the trade is
classified as a sell and +1 if it is classified as a buy. We use the quote method to
classify trades. For the trades that are not classified, we use the trade method.7
Less than one percent of trades are not identified with either method and these are
dropped from the sample. We calculate the price impact and the realized spread
as follows:
PriceImpacti = 200 ×D × Midquotei+1 −Midquotei
Midquotei
(5)
RealSpreadi = 200 ×D × Pricei −Midquotei+1
Midquotei
(6)
6The estimated values from (5) and (6) will not always sum to that from (4), because effective
spread is computed using the most recent bids and asks, while price impact is computed using
the 5-minute midquote.
7The quote method classifies a trade as a buy (sell) if it is at the prevailing ask (bid) price.
The trade rule classifies a trade as a buy (sell) if it is above (below) the previous trade. If there
is no price change but the previous trade was a buy (sell), then the trade is classified as a buy
(sell).
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where Midquotei+1 refers to the midquote recorded within a four-minute to eight-
minute time frame after each trade.
We compute realized volatility V ol from intraday returns (computed at the
midquote). In order to alleviate potential problems when estimating volatility in
less liquid markets and in the presence of jumps, we use the absolute (rather than
the squared) value of intraday returns, after dropping returns that lie further than
3 standard deviations from their ticker-specific mean. We report the standard
deviation of absolute intraday returns. The trading activity variables (number of
transactions, trade volume and trade size) refer to daily averages.
Comparisons across sub-periods 1 and 2, and across 3 and 4 are based on con-
tracts that are priced below AC0.20 and AC0.50, respectively. First, we assign all
contracts to baskets according to their type (call/put) and moneyness (DOTM,
OTM, ITM). All variables are calculated per asset and sub-period. We then per-
form a t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test on the differences in the
cross-sectional variation of the ticker-specific variables for the differences between
sub-periods 1 and 2, and separately for sub-periods 3 and 4. The reported esti-
mates are based on equally-weighted averages across tickers for each sub-period.
We estimate the effect of tick size changes on liquidity by employing the fol-
lowing Difference-in-Difference (DiD) model that will allow us to control for the
contemporaneous effects with a set of contracts that are trading at the same time
when the changes took place.8
Liqi,t = α + β × Treati,t + γ × Postt + δ × Treati,t × Postt + × Vi,t + zi,t (7)
Liq is the liquidity variable of interest (quoted spread, effective spread, depth,
price impact, realized spread). Treat is a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 for options that are affected by the implementation of the PBTS, i.e. options
priced equal to or below AC0.20 in the first set of regressions, and options priced
between AC0.20 and AC0.50 in the second set of regressions. Post is a dummy vari-
able that takes the value of 1 for dates after the implementation of the PBTS. For
the first (second) set of regressions, Post takes the value of 1 during sub-period
2 (sub-period 4). The base periods refer to sub-periods 1 and 3, respectively. Fi-
nally, V is a vector of control variables for the options and the underlying market,
which includes the reciprocal of price 1/Price (Pr), return volatility (V ol) and
the natural logarithm of trading volume (TrV ) for the options market. Volume is
excluded when depth is the dependent variable. We anticipate that liquidity will
be positively related to the reciprocal of price and to volatility and negatively re-
lated to volume (see Chung et al., 2004, Harris, 1994). For the underlying market,
8In a related context, Marsh and Payne (2012) use a DiD approach to investigate the effect
of short sale restrictions on market quality indicators.
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we include the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the underlying
asset (MV ), underlying volatility (V ol) and the closing percentage bid-ask spread
(PBAS). We use the range estimator as a measure of the underlying market volatil-
ity (see Petrella, 2006). We expect higher liquidity for the larger assets. Also, we
expect liquidity to deteriorate with increasing levels of PBAS and with decreasing
levels of underlying volatility (see Wei and Zheng, 2010).
The DiD allows us to extract the following information. First, α reflects the
liquidity of options that are not affected by the PBTS rule during the time before
the implementation of the PBTS rule. Second, β reflects the liquidity of options
that are affected by the PBTS rule before the implementation of the PBTS rule.
Third, γ quantifies the change in the liquidity of options that are not affected by
the PBTS rule after the implementation of the PBTS rule. Finally, δ picks up
the change in the liquidity of options priced below the price threshold after the
implementation of the PBTS rule.
In order to estimate Equation (7), the control group includes all options that
are priced under AC1.00 but greater than AC0.50, in order to maintain the price level
within a finite range. We estimate Equation (7) separately for calls and puts and
also for each moneyness level. All regressions are reported with double-clustered
robust standard errors that allow for dependence across time and also across stocks
(see Marsh and Payne, 2012).
5 Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the effect of the implementation of the PBTS on the liquidity
measures, separately for calls and puts and also across moneyness levels. In line
with Hypothesis 1 , quoted spreads for contracts priced below the PBTS thresh-
old declined significantly. For instance, in the 1st stage of the PBTS, the average
quoted spread for DOTM calls reduced by 34%, while spreads for OTM and ITM
calls fell by 49% and 55%, respectively. Similar spread declines are observed for
puts, and all spread differences are statistically significant. Spread reductions in
the 2nd stage of the PBTS are also consistently significant, albeit somewhat lower.
However, the increase in quoted spread liquidity is followed by a larger decrease in
quoted depth liquidity. Consistent with Hypothesis 2 , quoted depth has dropped
substantially for calls and puts across all moneyness levels, with these declines
being highly significant across all moneyness levels for the larger price threshold.
Another important finding is that, in contrast to the large variations before the
implementation of the PBTS, the number of quoted contracts post-PBTS remains
relatively constant across moneyness levels.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
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Hypothesis 3 is supported by the substantial increases that are observed in
quote and trade liquidity. For instance, the Log Quote Slope decreased by 21.42%
for DOTM calls and the effective spread decreased by 48.36% after the 1st stage of
the PBTS. This finding is consistent across both calls and puts of all moneyness
levels, for both stages of the PBTS. Overall, these results suggest that, along with
increased quoted liquidity after the implementation of the PBTS, effective spreads
demonstrated an even greater proportional decrease.
Figure 1 presents the evolution of quoted depth and spread for calls during
100-day windows surrounding the two implementation stages of the PBTS rule.
During the 1st stage of the PBTS, the decline of quoted spreads after the new rule
was gradual, with a new stable level reached after 10 days, while quoted depths
decreased substantially on the first day of the new tick size. During the 2nd stage
of the PBTS, a sharp decrease in quoted spreads is observed on the first day of the
change, implying that the larger tick size is more binding for options with higher
prices.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
As can be seen from Figure 2, which reports the outcomes of the same exercise
for quote and trade liquidity, the increase in liquidity is constrained by the de-
crease in quoted depth. During the 1st stage of the PBTS (and for DOTM options
during the 2nd stage), trade liquidity declines significantly while quote liquidity
remains relatively constant, suggesting that the drop in depth becomes larger as
moneyness increases. We investigate this further below.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
At this point, an interesting question arises about the extent to which larger
trades are affected by the reduction in quoted depth. Figure 3 attempts to answer
this question, examining DOTM and OTM contracts, for which the order book is
thinner (results are similar for ITM contracts). Here, we plot the cross-sectional
quoted depth from Figure 1 against the average trade size, in the days surrounding
the two tick size changes. We also construct confidence bands of 1 and 2 standard
deviations from the average trade size. We expect that 68% (95%) of trades will
lie within 1 (2) standard deviation(s) from the mean on any given day.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
Before the rule changes, the average trade size was substantially lower than the
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average quoted depth, suggesting that plentiful liquidity existed at the best bid
and ask to accommodate larger trades. Post-PBTS, the quoted depth decreased
significantly while the average trade size remained unchanged. When the trade
size’s confidence bands lie above the quoted depth, larger trades will not be exe-
cuted at the best bid/ask and will need to be filled further down in the order book
(even though the market can still accommodate the average trade). The overall
situation for investors who wish to trade large quantities is that they initially ben-
efit from the narrower bid-ask spread but, as their order is now less likely to be
fully executed at the top of the order book, they will have to then trade at inferior
prices further down the order book. The exact economic effect of this trade-off will
not be uniform across all trades and it can only be determined by examining the
full order book (which is not available to us). However, as the trade size increases,
an order must be processed at progressively inferior prices down the order book
while the benefit of a narrower initial spread remains fixed. Therefore, the larger
the trade size, the more likely that this trade-off has a negative net effect.
Table 2 investigates the components of the effective half spread. After the
implementation of the PBTS, effective spreads fell as a result of both the price im-
pact costs and the realized spreads falling, consistent with Hypothesis 4 . However,
the relative impact of these two components of effective spreads was not uniform.
In the 1st stage of the PBTS, the reduction in trade costs reported in Table 1 is
driven primarily by a decrease in realized spreads, which is consistent with market
makers losing revenues as they are obliged to provide liquidity in DOTM options.
In contrast, in the 2nd stage of the PBTS, the reduction in realized spreads is
relatively smaller than that in price impact, suggesting that the reduction in trade
costs is driven mainly by the latter element.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
The results from Table 3 are consistent with Hypothesis 5 . Trading activity
significantly increased after the rule changes, with OTM (DOTM) contracts ex-
periencing their biggest volume difference during the 1st (2nd) stage of the PBTS.
DOTM puts were more heavily affected than DOTM calls, which could be indica-
tive of investors’ appetite for the crash-insurance characteristics of DOTM puts,
especially during the declining spot market of the sample period. Furthermore,
the transaction frequency increased significantly, with OTM contracts experienc-
ing the largest increase (172% for calls and 217% for puts during the 1st stage). It
is worth noting that the trading volume of DOTM puts increased by more than
their transaction frequency, reflecting an increase in the average trade size.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
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Table 4 presents evidence in support of Hypothesis 6 . We classify tickers in sub-
periods 1 and 3 according to their transaction frequency, assign them to quartiles
in sub-periods 2 and 4 based on the previous transaction frequency, and estimate
effective half-spreads. As hypothesized, the narrowing of spreads was more pro-
nounced for tickers with the highest number of trades in DOTM and OTM calls
and puts. At the extreme, contracts in the low frequency category were associated
with zero spread changes in the 2nd stage. However, ITM contracts experienced
the greatest narrowing in spreads in the medium frequency category.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
Table 1 reports that liquidity increases more as moneyness increases, in contrast
to Hypothesis 7 . However, as we will show later, this initial result is not supported
when we control for other changes in the DiD regressions.
For each stage, we use the period before the PBTS implementation to sort
tickers into 3 groups according to the underlying assets’ volatilities, then we es-
timate the average Log Quote Slope before and after the tick size change. The
results (reported in Table 5) support Hypothesis 8 . In particular, for DOTM and
OTM options, quote liquidity increases by more for contracts with higher under-
lying volatility, while the reverse is true for ITM options. The intuition supported
by these results is that OTM (ITM) contracts with higher underlying volatility
are more (less) attractive than their lower volatility counterparts, hence are more
(less) likely to benefit from a reduced tick size.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
Table 3 provides some support for Hypothesis 9 , because volatility during the
1st stage of the PBTS is found to decrease by more as moneyness increases. How-
ever, decreases in volatility are fairly similar across moneyness groups during the
2nd stage of the PBTS.
We evaluate the effect of the PBTS on execution speed by examining quote
revisions. We use the entire time-series at the best bid/ask (rather than sampling
every 5 minutes) and we define as a price improvement every new best bid (ask)
that is higher (lower) than the previous one.9 We subsequently compute the per-
centage of quote improvements per sub-ticker per day, with the results presented
in Table 6 and Figure 4. For options priced below AC0.20, quote improvements
increased by 274% (259%) for DOTM calls (puts), with smaller changes reported
9The procedure is conducted in tick time and not in clock time as there are several new quotes
per second.
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as moneyness increases (reaching -3% for ITM puts). During the 2nd stage of the
PBTS, quote improvements experienced a similar increase for DOTM contracts,
but they exceeded 100% for OTM and ITM options. This finding is an outcome
of the price level effect, as traders have more opportunities to step ahead in higher
priced contracts. Overall, the results provide support for Hypothesis 10 , which
states that quote revisions would increase after the tick size reduction, which is
potentially damaging for larger traders. This change is likely to have had a signif-
icant effect on the order book, as it allows traders to take advantage of the price
priority rule and potentially step ahead of larger trades. However, we are unable
to provide further specific evidence of this.
[Insert Figure 4 around here]
[Insert Table 6 around here]
The final aspect of our analysis involves estimating the DiD regression in (7)
in order to quantify the differences in liquidity for tickers affected by the PBTS,
controlling for liquidity changes in tickers that are unaffected by the PBTS.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
Table 7 presents the results with dependent variables being quoted spread and
depth. In order to conserve space, we report results for calls only (results for
puts are similar and available upon request). Similarly to our previous findings,
quoted spreads generally narrowed after the tick size reduction. However, after
controlling for the price level, volatility and volume, spreads fell by more for lower
moneyness contracts, supporting Hypothesis 7 . As anticipated, liquidity is posi-
tively associated with price and volatility, but negatively associated with volume.
Quoted spreads are smaller for larger firms and increase as the underlying asset’s
spread increases. The underlying asset volatility is inversely related to liquidity
for the lower-priced options, but not significantly for the higher-priced contracts.
Furthermore, quoted depth decreases by more as moneyness increases. Overall,
our findings suggest that contracts that are further OTM have benefitted more
from the tick size change, experiencing the largest narrowing in spread and the
smallest decrease in depth.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
Table 8 presents the DiD results for quote and trade liquidity. As expected,
effective half spreads are smaller and they have experienced a smaller change in
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liquidity compared to quoted spreads, across both PBTS stages. Also, spreads for
the control group have remained constant across the two sub-periods, as evidenced
by the insignificant coefficients for Post in the 2nd stage. Spreads decrease by more
as moneyness increases, providing further evidence in support of Hypothesis 7 . A
final finding in support of the PBTS having an overall positive effect on quote and
trade liquidity relates to the increase in quote liquidity post-PBTS, as identified
by the significantly negative coefficient for the Treat× Post variable.
6 Conclusions
The debate over adopting a reduced tick size is on-going and has significant impli-
cations for market liquidity, particularly in terms of striking an appropriate balance
between lower trading costs for investors and adequate incentives for market mak-
ers to support illiquid assets. This paper uses data from a “natural” experiment of
two consecutive reductions in tick size occuring at the NYSE LIFFE equity option
market in order to explore the impact of tick size changes on liquidity.
Our results suggest that, while quoted spread decreased more for deep OTM
options, quoted depth deteriorated more for options that are further ITM, im-
plying an increase in overall liquidity for OTM contracts but a decrease for ITM
ones. Effective spreads decreased more than quoted spreads for contracts with
low moneyness, but the significance disappears as moneyness increases. For the
lower-priced contracts, the drop in effective spreads is due to a decrease in real
costs net of the price impact of trades, but the decrease in real costs disappeared
when the price threshold increased.
Importantly, we show that the ability of the market to absorb larger trades
has diminished after the change in the tick size. However, this reduced capac-
ity to absorb large trades may not impact the vast majority of traders in this
market because it is heavily populated by retail investors who typically engage in
smaller trades. We document a substantial increase in quote revisions which im-
plies that the decrease in tick size has increased price competition among market
participants. Finally, we document an increase in trading activity for deep OTM
contracts, which is associated with a substantial increase in option volatility.
These findings have important implications for optimal contract design in eq-
uity option markets. The goal of attracting liquidity has been achieved with two
immediate implications: economic rents have been transferred from market mak-
ers to individual investors and the increase in liquidity has been realized at the
expense of a thinner market for larger investors. The price/time priority rule may
not be effective when a particularly large trade enters the market, and in such
instances, market makers could be allowed to increase their economic rents for
facilitating abnormal trade sizes in a manner similar to an upstairs market. A sec-
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ond possible scenario would be for the exchange to introduce a pro-rata algorithm
that will circumvent the problem with the price priority rule when the tick size is
too small.
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Table 1: Measures of Quoted and Traded Liquidity
Calls Puts
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM
Quoted Spread 1st stage Before 61.6 51.44 48.3 59.64 49.69 46.08
After 40.6 26.28 21.36 41.64 23.73 19.42
% diff -34.09*** -48.91*** -55.77*** -30.18*** -52.24*** -57.85***
2nd stage Before 19.38 18.28 16.53 19.07 18.15 16.43
After 13.89 11.23 8.77 12.27 10.34 8.67
% diff -28.32*** -38.56*** -46.94*** -35.65*** -43.03*** -47.23***
Quoted Depth 1st stage Before 895.81 1131.34 1144.93 995.16 1161.11 1401.83
After 378.81 378.37 413.04 383.21 385.44 411.9
% diff -57.71*** -66.55*** -63.92*** -61.49*** -66.8*** -70.61***
2nd stage Before 861.63 1095.07 1352.92 908.39 1156.35 1371.55
After 293.22 347.31 412.97 364.89 392.07 426.51
% diff -65.96*** -68.28*** -69.47*** -59.83*** -66.09*** -68.90***
Log Quote Slope 1st stage Before 0.056 0.043 0.042 0.053 0.041 0.039
After 0.044 0.028 0.024 0.046 0.025 0.022
% diff -21.42*** -34.88*** -42.85*** -13.2*** -39.02*** -43.58***
2nd stage Before 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.013
After 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.011 0.009
% diff -11.76*** -18.75*** -30.76*** -23.52*** -26.66*** -30.76***
Effective Half Spread 1st stage Before 42.08 35.75 32.97 39.89 34.25 30.33
After 21.73 14.76 13.68 22.63 14.86 12.75
% diff -48.36*** -58.71*** -58.50*** -43.26*** -56.61*** -57.96***
2nd stage Before 16.89 15.85 13.31 16.7 15.57 12.89
After 9.54 7.52 5.26 8.72 7.32 5
% diff -43.51*** -52.55*** -60.48*** -47.78*** -52.98*** -61.21***
NOTE : % Quoted Spread is estimated as 100 × (Aski −Bidi)/Midquotei, where Midquote refers to the average of bid and ask price. Quoted
Depth refers to the average number of contracts at the ask and bid price, estimated in 5-minute intervals. Log Quote Slope is estimated as
(AskiBidi)/(log(V olumeask,i) + log(V olumebid,i)), % Effective Half Spread is estimated as 200 × D × (Pricei −Midquotei)/Midquotei, where D
refers to a trade indicator dummy that takes the value of -1 is the trade is classified as a sell and +1 if it is classified as a buy. The first stage refers
to the period around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the dates around the second implementation of
PBTS (April 1, 2010). Before (after) refers to the 150-day period before (after) the implementation of PBTS. For calls, we define DOTM contracts
with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness larger than or equal to 0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and ITM contracts with moneyness
between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2: Realized Spread and Price Impact
Calls Puts
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM
Price Impact 1st stage Before 24.84 24.65 28.81 23.97 23.04 22.59
After 10.51 9.11 7.1 10.15 8.47 9.08
% diff -57.68*** -63.04*** -75.35 -57.65*** -63.23*** -59.8
2nd stage Before 10.88 11.15 9.31 11.24 11.34 9.45
After 5.61 5.27 3.68 5.24 5.29 3.35
% diff -48.43*** -52.73*** -60.47*** -53.38*** -53.35*** -64.55***
Realized Spread 1st stage Before 16.18 13.4 7.06 15.04 12.45 11.71
After 6.42 3.61 2.96 6.88 3.69 1.01
% diff -60.32*** -73.05*** -58.07** -54.25*** -70.36*** -91.37
2nd stage Before 5.41 4.12 3.72 4.78 3.89 3.38
After 2.82 1.67 0.96 2.38 1.28 1.1
% diff -47.87*** -59.46 -74.19 -50.20*** -67.09** -67.45
NOTE : % Realized spread is estimated as 200×D×(Pricei −Midquotei+1)/Midquotei, where D refers to a trade indicator dummy that takes the value
of -1 is the trade is classified as a sell and +1 if it is classified as a buy. % Price impact is estimated as 200×D×(Midquotei+1 −Midquotei)/Midquotei.
The first stage refers to the period around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the dates around the
second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). Before (after) refers to the 150-day period before (after) the implementation of PBTS. For calls, we
define DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness larger than or equal to 0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and ITM
contracts with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Trading Activity and Volatility
Calls Puts
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM
Traded Volume 1st stage Before 11365.52 3780.21 337.5 6063.52 1738.92 200.93
After 17090.36 12100.3 770.85 14121.94 6549.01 402.69
% diff 50.37*** 220.09*** 128.4*** 132.9*** 276.61*** 100.41***
2nd stage Before 5716.99 15974.12 5638.36 5200.63 9628.09 2954.12
After 10318.66 24612.85 6387.93 12627.98 17212.51 4041.42
% diff 80.49*** 54.07*** 13.29 142.81*** 78.77*** 36.8***
Trades 1st stage Before 247.32 80.56 7.97 136.25 42.62 6.57
After 292.78 219.67 17.24 307.77 135.52 10.46
% diff 18.38** 172.67*** 116.31*** 125.88*** 217.97*** 59.20***
2nd stage Before 164.97 465.75 144.65 142.35 303.47 97.96
After 231.81 590.84 157.8 211.37 366.07 108.4
% diff 40.51*** 26.85*** 9.09 48.48*** 20.62*** 10.65***
Volatility 1st stage Before 5.16 5.92 7.06 4.43 5.31 5.75
After 4.57 4.42 4.2 4.35 4.14 4.15
% diff -11.43*** -25.33*** -40.50*** -1.80** -22.03*** -27.82*
2nd stage Before 3.28 3.62 3.4 2.96 3.5 3.24
After 2.1 2.48 2.18 1.93 2.29 2.07
% diff -35.97*** -31.49*** -35.88*** -34.79*** -34.57*** -36.11***
NOTE : Traded Volume refers to the average volume per day, Trades refer to the total number of transactions per day and Volatility is estimated
as the standard deviation of the absolute value of intraday 5-minute returns. The first stage refers to the period around the first implementation of
PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the dates around the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). Before (after) refers to the
150-day period before (after) the implementation of PBTS. For calls, we define DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts
with moneyness larger than or equal to 0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and ITM contracts with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite
classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Traded Liquidity by Transaction Frequency
Calls Puts
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM
Low 1st stage Before 43.39 33.82 32.85 40.59 38.95 37.14
After 26.1 24.38 19.31 33.44 22.5 19.06
% diff -39.84*** -27.91*** -41.21*** -17.61** -42.23*** -48.68***
2nd stage Before 20.36 20.39 17.96 20.31 20.62 15.34
After 18.31 14.62 9.67 17.67 16.01 8.34
% diff -10.06 -28.29 -46.15 -12.99* -22.35 -45.63
Medium 1st stage Before 42.67 38.04 37.08 38.34 35.63 31.97
After 25.6 17.95 11.2 24.02 16.6 10.48
% diff -40.00*** -52.81*** -69.79*** -37.35*** -53.41*** -67.21***
2nd stage Before 17.42 17.18 13.92 17.36 16.47 13.23
After 11.64 9.52 7.49 10.8 8.87 6.89
% diff -33.18*** -44.58*** -46.19 -37.78*** -46.14** -47.92
High 1st stage Before 41.85 35.38 31.1 40.19 33.74 28.76
After 20.26 13.52 12.9 21.09 14.03 13.46
% diff -51.58*** -61.78*** -58.52*** -47.52*** -58.41*** -53.19***
2nd stage Before 16.62 15.38 13.18 16.27 15.18 12.8
After 8.33 6.71 4.87 7.45 6.63 4.7
% diff -49.87*** -56.37*** -63.05*** -54.21*** -56.32*** -63.28**
NOTE : Traded Liquidity refers to the effective spread, estimated as 200×D× (Pricei −Midquotei)/Midquotei, where D refers to a trade indicator
dummy that takes the value of -1 is the trade is classified as a sell and +1 if it is classified as a buy. Low, medium and high refer to daily transaction
frequency. Low refers to the first quartile and High to the fourth quartile. Medium refers to the second and third quartile. The first stage refers to the
period around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the dates around the second implementation of PBTS
(April 1, 2010). Before (after) refers to the 150-day period before (after) the implementation of PBTS. For calls, we define DOTM contracts with
moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness larger than or equal to 0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and ITM contracts with moneyness
between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Quoted Liquidity by Underlying Volatility
Calls Puts
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM
Low 1st stage Before 0.054 0.041 0.039 0.049 0.039 0.04
After 0.046 0.026 0.016 0.048 0.023 0.015
% diff -14.81* -36.58*** -58.97*** -2.04 -41.02*** -62.5***
2nd stage Before 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.017 0.014 0.012
After 0.017 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.01 0.008
% diff -10.52* -26.66*** -33.33 -23.52*** -28.57*** -33.33
Medium 1st stage Before 0.062 0.049 0.037 0.062 0.046 0.034
After 0.048 0.035 0.016 0.052 0.031 0.017
% diff -22.58*** -28.57*** -56.75*** -16.12*** -32.60*** -50.00***
2nd stage Before 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.02 0.019 0.018
After 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.017
% diff -9.52 -5.26*** -11.11 -15*** -15.78*** -5.55
High 1st stage Before 0.054 0.045 0.048 0.05 0.043 0.042
After 0.04 0.028 0.036 0.04 0.025 0.028
% diff -25.92*** -37.77*** -25.00*** -20.00*** -41.86*** -33.33***
2nd stage Before 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.013
After 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.01 0.01 0.009
% diff -13.33 -26.66*** -35.71*** -33.33*** -28.57*** -30.76***
NOTE : Quoted Liquidity refers to log quote slope estimated as (Aski − Bidi)/(log(V olumeask,i) + log(V olumebid,i)). We use the range estimator
as a measure of the underlying market volatility. We use the period before the implementation of the tick size changes to classify tickers based on
liquidity. The first stage refers to the period around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the dates around
the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). Before (after) refers to the 150-day period before (after) the implementation of PBTS. For calls,
we define DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness larger than or equal to 0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and
ITM contracts with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: % Price Improvement
Calls Puts
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM
1st stage Before 4.2 4.53 11.55 4.39 4.45 18.23
After 15.7 15.17 17.7 15.77 16.16 17.67
% diff 273.80*** 234.87*** 53.24* 259.22*** 263.14*** -3.07***
2nd stage Before 5.42 6.07 5.8 5.43 6.53 6.16
After 17.87 16.72 15.34 17.43 16.55 15.17
% diff 229.70*** 175.45*** 164.48*** 220.99*** 153.44*** 146.26***
NOTE : For the calculation of % Price Improvement we use the entire time series at the best bid and ask and for each subticker, we classify a new best
bid or best ask as a price improvement when the new ask is smaller than the previous ask or the new bid is greater than the old bid.We follow this
procedure separately for calls and puts and across moneyness levels. We subsequently calculate the percentage of quote improvements per subticker,
per day.The first stage refers to the period around the first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the dates around
the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). Before (after) refers to the 150-day period before (after) the implementation of PBTS. For calls,
we define DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness larger than or equal to 0.9 but smaller than 1.00 and
ITM contracts with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 7: DID Quoted Spread and Quoted Depth
Spread Depth
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM
Constant 17.91*** 13.08*** 7.06*** 13.65*** 13.97*** 10.00*** -1671*** -2667*** -3345*** -1635*** -2546*** -3381***
(23.46) (35.82) (15.91) (23.22) (43.27) (34.44) (-16.89) (-36.24) (-41.82) (-23.10) (-38.54) (-39.35)
Treatment 27.77*** 23.69*** 12.42*** 3.65*** 3.64*** 3.10*** 201*** 281*** -539*** 238*** 233*** 108***
(104.73) (72.25) (10.70) (36.16) (60.76) (44.34) (16.19) (14.70) (-5.96) (15.67) (21.04) (5.61)
Post -1.33*** -0.56*** -0.79*** 1.78*** 0.89*** 0.22*** 19.64 -8.00 69.50*** -109*** -75.4*** 161.22***
(-11.38) (-8.11) (-11.42) (20.94) (19.38) (4.28) (0.64) (-0.34) (3.01) (-4.54) (-3.46) (5.01)
Treat×
Post
-30.95*** -28.04*** -24.91*** -10.04*** -10.03*** -9.08*** -553*** -878*** -1006*** -613*** -751*** -1004***
(-120.45) (-96.68) (-20.79) (-64.57) (-114.74) (-100.78) (-23.00) (-32.63) (-10.99) (-27.48) (-39.93) (-29.48)
V olatility 0.38*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.47*** 0.31*** 0.33*** -32.18*** -25.08*** -20.69*** -24.65*** -35.15*** -46.21***
(26.36) (29.99) (29.58) (23.42) (46.00) (49.89) (-23.23) (-27.12) (-17.29) (-22.54) (-33.22) (-24.88)
1/Pr 2.82*** 2.48*** 4.22*** 4.13*** 3.75*** 3.16*** 1.24*** 3.15*** 226.28*** 74.63*** 94.37*** 241.21***
(97.82) (65.24) (22.37) (95.79) (124.41) (70.13) (2.86) (3.95) (15.89) (20.64) (24.54) (25.14)
V olume 0.90*** 1.92*** 1.89*** -0.98*** 0.16*** 0.96***
(8.79) (40.27) (41.63) (-7.45) (3.60) (22.04)
UnderMV -1.71*** -1.99*** -1.69*** -0.47*** -1.21*** -1.33*** 248.16*** 380.91*** 441.76*** 229.32*** 338.65*** 456.81***
(-20.63) (-46.14) (-49.78) (-5.31) (-30.42) (-36.97) (26.21) (55.62) (60.63) (31.71) (52.04) (54.55)
PBAS 1.92*** 1.65*** 1.20*** 4.15*** 4.02*** 3.90*** -13.40*** 13.43*** 18.65*** 22.62*** 206.32*** -60.84***
(2.70) (4.59) (4.36) (4.48) (8.11) (9.63) (-0.14) (0.19) (0.29) (0.26) (2.90) (-0.73)
UnderV olt -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.16*** 0.07 0.01 < 0.01 64.68*** 78.16*** 73.99*** 57.56*** 97.85*** 85.37***
(-7.37) (-13.18) (-12.07) (1.63) (0.61) (0.05) (11.30) (16.15) (14.71) (8.15) (14.16) (10.26)
R2 0.74 0.75 0.46 0.36 0.45 0.41 0.27 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.39 0.45
NOTE : Spread refers to quoted spread and depth refers to quoted depth. Treatment is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for options that are
affected by the implementation of the PBTS. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the dates after the implementation of the PBTS.
Volatility is estimated as the absolute value of intraday 5-minute returns. Pr refers to option price, V olume is the natural logarithm of trading volume
per interval, UnderMV refers to the natural logarithm of market capitalization of the underlying asset, PBAS refers to the underlying percentage
bid-ask spread and UnderV olt refers to the underlying volatility estimated used the range estimator. The first stage refers to the period around the
first implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the dates around the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010).
For calls, we define DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness between 0.9 and 1.00 and ITM contracts
with moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 8: DID Traded and Quoted Liquidity
Spread Depth
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM DOTM OTM ITM
Constant 17.31*** 14.90*** 5.23*** 14.71*** 14.09*** 5.47*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01***
(16.94) (17.47) (8.85) (11.12) (19.94) (14.83) (31.27) (54.59) (31.10) (22.64) (50.88) (49.92)
Treatment 23.36*** 20.35*** 10.53*** 3.89*** 3.75*** 2.91*** 2.1E-2*** 1.6E-2*** 9.0E-2*** 2.0E-2*** 2.0E-2*** 2.0E-2***
(56.63) (43.81) (6.39) (9.39) (18.48) (20.08) (53.26) (40.81) (6.76) (14.43) (30.09) (29.49)
Post -1.32*** -0.60*** -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 0.01 -2E-2*** 0.001*** -1E-2*** 3E-2*** 1E-2*** 0.001***
(-5.17) (-3.29) (-0.35) (-0.25) (-0.47) (0.30) (-8.31) (2.96) (-8.73) (15.09) (15.03) (3.56)
Treat×
Post
-23.90*** -22.37*** -17.02*** -8.01*** -8.53*** -8.39*** -2E-2*** -2E-2*** -1E-2*** -5E-2*** -6E-2*** -6E-2***
(-57.69) (-45.58) (-12.40) (-18.18) (-40.97) (-66.45) (-53.00) (-57.60) (-10.63) (-29.34) (-56.41) (-77.59)
V olatility 0.22*** 0.16*** -0.01 0.40*** 0.35*** 0.05*** 1.0E-2*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 1.0E-2*** 0.001*** 0.0E-2***
(4.77) (4.88) (-1.39) (5.80) (9.28) (4.39) (29.12) (23.73) (21.67) (17.02) (33.65) (36.31)
1/Pr 1.23*** 1.12*** 2.69*** 2.34*** 2.33*** 2.40*** 3.0E-2*** 2.0E-2*** 4.0E-2*** 4.0E-2*** 3.0E-2*** 2.0E-2***
(30.12) (25.20) (8.35) (13.91) (23.33) (22.57) (77.24) (48.44) (17.83) (58.77) (89.38) (57.65)
V olume -0.76*** -0.65*** -0.22*** -0.77*** -0.87*** -0.24*** -4E-2*** -2E-2*** -1E-2*** -2E-2*** -2E-2*** -2E-2***
(-7.74) (-9.18) (-7.79) (-6.84) (-14.58) (-8.76) (-31.30) (-48.83) (-47.90) (-23.51) (-50.51) (-45.53)
UnderMV -0.59*** -0.38*** 0.01 -0.46*** -0.14*** 0.09***
(-8.03) (-7.35) (0.77) (-5.60) (-3.70) (3.26)
PBAS 0.53 1.38 -0.34 1.55 1.07 0.42 5.0E-2*** 3.0E-2*** 2.0E-2*** 7.0E-2*** 6.0E-2*** 5.0E-02
(0.55) (1.39) (-0.95) (0.93) (1.12) (1.25) (3.63) (5.72) (5.89) (4.22) (8.15) (10.21)
UnderV olt -0.21*** -0.19*** 0.02** -0.23*** -0.25*** 0.02* -1E-2*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(-6.74) (-4.90) (2.46) (-3.10) (-5.90) (1.67) (-11.11) (10.37) (9.74) (3.44) (4.17) (1.18)
R2 0.37 0.16 0.36 0.04 0.04 0.39 0.62 0.65 0.46 0.23 0.37 0.42
NOTE : Traded liquidity refers to effective spread, estimated as 200 × D × (Pricei −Midquotei)/Midquotei, where D refers to a trade indicator
dummy that takes the value of -1 if the trade is classified as a sell and +1 if it is classified as a buy. Quoted liquidity refers to log quote slope estimated
as (Aski − Bidi)/(log(V olumeask,i) + log(V olumebid,i)). Treatment is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for options that are affected by
the implementation of the PBTS. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the dates after the implementation of the PBTS. Volatility
is estimated as the absolute value of intraday 5-minute returns. Pr refers to option price, V olume is the natural logarithm of trading volume per
interval, UnderMV refers to the natural logarithm of market capitalization of the underlying asset, PBAS refers to the underlying percentage bid-ask
spread and UnderV olt refers to the underlying volatility estimated used the range estimator. The first stage refers to the period around the first
implementation of PBTS (June 02, 2009) and the second stage refers to the dates around the second implementation of PBTS (April 1, 2010). For
calls, we define DOTM contracts with moneyness smaller than 0.9, OTM contracts with moneyness between 0.9 and 1.00 and ITM contracts with
moneyness between or equal to 1.00 and 1.10. The opposite classification is used for puts. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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Figure 1: Quoted Spread and Depth Around the Tick Size Change
Notes: This Figure plots the average quoted spread and quoted depth for contracts trading around the implementation of the PBTS. The horizontal axis
refers to days to and from the 1st and 2nd stage of PBTS. Due to space considerations, we only present the result for call contracts.
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Figure 2: Quoted and Traded Liquidity Around the Tick Size Change
Notes: This Figure plots the average effective half spread (EHS) and quoted log slope (Slope) for contracts trading around the implementation of the
PBTS. The horizontal axis refers to days to and from the 1st and 2nd stage of PBTS. Due to space considerations, we only present the result for call
contracts.
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Figure 3: Average Depth and Trade Size Around the Tick Size Change
Notes: This Figure plots the average trade size and quote depth the around the implementation
of the PBTS. SD refers to the standard deviation of the mean trade size. For the first (last) two
plots, the horizontal axis refers to days to and from to June 2, 2009 (April 1, 2010) (day 0). Due
to space considerations, we only present the result for call contracts.
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Figure 4: Mean Quote Improvement Around the Tick Size Changes
Notes: This figure plots the percentage of price improvement for the periods before and after
the implementation of the two stages of PBTS. We classify a new best bid or best ask as a price
improvement when the new ask is smaller than the previous ask or the new bid is greater than
the old bid. The horizontal axis refers to days to and from the 1st and 2nd stage of PBTS.
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